Supreme Court Chief Justice Reynato Puno was in town last Jan. 26. He was generous enough to share his precious time with the local media in a breakfast press conference at the Jam Sweet Jam Restaurant. The center of discussion that ensued was the circular he issued that advised judges nationwide to impose fines instead of prison terms to persons convicted of libel. Following is an excerpt of the press conference:
Chief Justice Puno: Indeed, yesterday, after addressing the financial executives of the Philippines, I was ambush-interviewed. And one of the questions asked was whether the Court has approved that kind of a circular. And so, I confirmed to them that last Tuesday in the en banc meeting of the SC, the entire membership of the court agreed to have that kind of a circular issued by the Chief Justice.
But let me give the background why that circular was issued. A few days ago, or perhaps a week or so, the National Press Club through Roy Mabasa, its president, wrote to the SC specifically requesting the court committee on the revision of the rules of court to revisit some of these rules involving the implementation of our libel law. The National Press Club had two requests: 1. That the members of the media be exempted from posting bail in cases where they are the accused in criminal cases, and 2. To look at the probability of asking the judges to impose fines instead of imprisonment in cases where the Court would convict a member of the media in libel cases.
On the first request, the Court decided to turn it down, precisely on the ground that if you craft a rule which would only be distinct and applicable to members of the media they come into conflict with the doctrine on equal protection of the law. Moreover, that may need an amendment of the some of our substantive laws like the revised penal code and it is familiar knowledge that the Court cannot amend a law enacted by congress.
On the second request, however, the Court, upon recommendation of the committee, agreed with the National Press Club. And so, the Court approved that request to the effect that in cases of libel, where the circumstances so demand, the judge may in the use of his or her wise discretion, can opt to impose the penalty of fine instead of imprisonment.
Question: And these are questions that appeared to have been raised by some officials of the executive department. For instance, if the news accounts are correct, the Presidential Legal Counsel, as well as the Secretary of Justice, says that in doing this, the Court, specifically the Chief Justice, may have impinged on the power of Congress to make laws. With all due respect, there is no such impingement on the substantive power of Congress to make laws.
What is the law that is concerned here? It’s the law on libel, more specifically, article 355 of the revised penal code. You look at article 355 of the revised penal code, Congress deemed it wise to impose the following penalty in libel cases: the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium period, that is the imprisonment penalty and/or fine of P2,000 up to P6,000. In other words, the courts have that discretion to impose either imprisonment or to impose fine or to impose both penalties. That is the law on libel.
Now, in various cases, starting 1996 up to 2006, the SC has already handed down decisions holding that in some cases where the exigent circumstances so demand, the penalty that should be imposed on those accused/convicted of libel should not be imprisonment but only fine. In other words, this is not by any means new jurisprudence. This ruling has been handed down by the Court way back in 1996.
Let me refer to some of the cases: First, the case of Sazon vs. the People of the Philippines. Here, the court modified the penalty upon the petitioner, the accused, who was an officer of a homeowners’ association, for the crime of libel from imprisonment to a fine only of P3,000. Why? For the reason that the accused wrote the libelous article merely to defend his honor against the malicious messages circulated against him in the subdivision. So, that was the circumstance that was used by the Court in order to change the penalty from imprisonment to fine. And that was in 1996. Was there any objection on the part of the Solicitor General, who represented the People of the Philippines in that case? There was no objection. There was no motion for reconsideration. In other words, there was agreement even on the part of the executive department represented by the Solicitor General in the change of the penalty from imprisonment to fine because of that particular circumstance.
Then you have another case, Quirico Mari vs. the People of the Philippines. Here the crime is slander. Again the SC modified the penalty on the accused. The accused was an ordinary government employee. So, he was sentenced to imprisonment. On appeal, the SC said, you just impose a fine of P1,000. What is the reason for the change of penalty? The ground used by the SC is that the slander, the offense, was committed in the heat of anger and in reaction to a perceived provocation. That case was rendered in 2000. Again, there was no objection from the Solicitor General. There was no motion for reconsideration.
Then, in 2004, this is a more familiar case, the case of Roberto Brillante vs. People of the Philippines. Brillante is the political opponent of Mayor Jejomar Binay of Makati. So, Brillante was convicted of libel. He was sentenced to suffer imprisonment. He was convicted in five cases of libel. But on appeal to the SC, the justices held that instead of imprisonment, Brillante should just pay the corresponding fines. What is the reason for that? The Court held that these offenses were committed during the election period in 1988 in Makati where passions ran very high. And the Court said that this must have agitated the accused into writing these open letters to the people of Makati. Letters, which contained these libelous statements. Again, there was no motion for reconsideration from the Solicitor General.
Lastly, this is a relatively new case, decided in 2006, the case of Buatis vs. the People of the Philippines. The accused here was a lawyer. He was convicted of libel; the penalty imposed was imprisonment. But again, on appeal, the penalty was changed from imprisonment to fine. What is the justification? The Court said that this was the first offense of the lawyer and he was motivated purely by his belief that he was exercising a civic and moral duty when he wrote the defamatory letter to the complainant. Again the Solicitor General did not file a motion for reconsideration protesting the change of the penalty from imprisonment to fine.
In other words, you look at the trend of these cases: There is that emerging rule of preference. That in libel cases, where circumstances so justify, the judges, the courts, need not necessarily impose imprisonment but only a fine. And that is specifically allowed by the libel law that was enacted by Congress. In other words, there is no violation of the policy laid down by Congress in enacting the libel law.
So, in light of that, we issued this circular. But let me read to you the dispositive portion of the circular after laying down those premises:
1. This administrative circular does not remove imprisonment as an alternative remedy for the crime of libel under article 355 of the revised penal code. And so, the Court never usurped the power of Congress to make laws or to impose penalty. The circular is precisely in accordance with the libel law, allowing the imposition either of the penalty of imprisonment or the penalty of fine.
2. The judges concerned may, in the exercise of sound discretion in taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case, determine whether the imposition of a fine alone would best serve the interest of justice or whether for bearing to impose imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, court violence on the social order or otherwise be contrary to the imperatives of justice. In other words, the circular allows the judge elasticity in what penalty should be imposed. There is no strict order for the judge to impose only a fine. The circular defines in black and white the parameters, the standards that should be taken into account in determining whether imprisonment should be imposed or only a fine.
3. Should only be a fine be imposed and the accused be unable to pay the fine, there is no legal obstacle to the application of the revised penal code provisions on subsidiary imprisonment. In other words, let us say the judge imposes a fine and the accused is unable to pay the fine. Then in that kind of a situation, the accused will be imprisoned for failure to pay the fine. In other words, the circular has not abolished the penalty of imprisonment.
I think our friends from the executive department were too quick in reacting to the circular issued by the Court. The reactions were given even before the circular was issued. But with the block letter provisions in the circular, I would not think that there could be any complaint that this circular constitutes a usurpation of the power of the Congress.
Of course, there is that other objection that this circular unduly favors the members of the media. Again, that is a baseless objection. The circular applies to all accused in libel cases, whether you are a member of the media or not, you are accused in a libel case, you can benefit from this circular. So, there is no basis for the objection that this circular violates the principle of equality. It does not treat only the members of the media.
Let me also stress that this circular likewise takes into consideration the nature of a libel offense. A libel offense is not a heinous crime. That is why the revised penal code penalizes the crime of libel only with imprisonment, even if it is imprisonment but only imprisonment of prision correccional, meaning 6 months to four years. In other words, it is not serious an offense. Or look at the range of the fines imposed on the libel law. It is only P200 to P6,000. So this is a minor offense.
But I may grant that this will do a great favor to members of the media. But what is wrong with that? Don’t we consider freedom of speech and of the press as enjoying a preferred status in our hierarchy of rights under the Constitution? So if that privilege is given to the members of the media, that is in accord with the letter and the spirit of the Constitution, which gives a preferred status to our freedom of speech and of the press and this is consistent with the unyielding jurisprudence of the Supreme Court. That when it comes to violations of freedoms of speech and of the press, we will always adopt that highest standard in examining whether there is such a breach of freedom of speech and of the press. So, this is in accord with the architecture of the constitution on freedom of speech and of the press.
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Every freedom, every right can be abused. But the possibility of abuse is not per se a justification for the curtailment of a constitutional right. The fear, I’d like to submit, is without any basis. The crime of libel would still be in the statute of books. The punishment as conceived by Congress will still be there. The punishment of imprisonment or fine or both. And so, if you have a situation, if you have case where the freedom of speech and of the press has really been abuse then the Court can impose an imprisonment on the accused and not only imprisonment but both imprisonment and fine. So, the safeguards are there. They have not been removed by the circular.
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As I said, the comments of presidential legal counsel Apostol were obviously given before the circular was issued. I take it as off-the-cuff statements. So, I suggest that he read, study very well the circular. It is very clear that the circular did not usurp the power of Congress to make laws; the power of Congress to declare what ought to be the penalty of a particular crime. … So the circular is well within the powers of SC when SC stated that the judge can opt for the penalty of fine when circumstances so demand. So, I do not see why there could be a basis of a complaint for impeachment. But if we will be impeached for protecting the rights of the people, so be it.
